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1. INTRODUCTION
Employer-sponsored pension plans, especially those in which partici-
pants may direct their investments, are common in the American workplace.'
Equally common is the likelihood that the employer sponsoring such a plan will
be a party to a reorganization in which it, along with its 401(k) plan,2 will merge
with another company.3 When a merger of 401(k) plans occurs, the roles of the
I As of 1997, 401(k) plans "accounted for 37 percent of qualified private retirement plans, 48
percent of active employees, and 65 percent of new contributions." JACK L. VANDERHEI, EBRI
SPECIAL REPORT: COMPANY STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS: RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF ISCEBS MEMBERS
2 (January 28, 2002) (citing United States Dept. of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Admini-
stration, "Abstract of 1997 Form 5500 Annual Reports," Private Pension Plan Bulletin No. 10,
Winter 2001, Washington, D.C.). Similarly, they were the only employer-sponsored plan avail-
able for approximately half of their 33 million active participants. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration, Private Pension Plan Bulletin, Abstract of 1997 Form 5500
Annual Reports Table D5 (1997). According to the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, as
of the year 2000, 401(k) plans will have 43,200,000 participants and 1.7 trillion dollars in assets.
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Growth of 401(k) Eligible Participants, Assets and
Plans 1984-2000, at http://www.psca.org/data/dcstats2.asp (last visited April 21, 2002).
Although not all 401(k) plans are participant-directed, most are: according to a recent sur-
vey by the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, 97 percent of companies surveyed allowed
participants to direct their own contributions, while 84.4 percent allowed them to direct company
contributions. Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Defined Contribution Plans 1978-2000,
at http://www.psca.org/data/dcstats5.asp (last visited April 21, 2002).
2 See infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing definition and features of a 401(k)
plan).
3 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has described the United States as being "in the
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employer as a plan sponsor4 and fiduciary appear, at first glance, to collide.
Normally, a plan sponsor may adopt, terminate, or modify a plan without impli-
cating fiduciary responsibilities under the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act ("ERISA" or "the Act")5 because these are "settlor" functions that do
not implicate ERISA's fiduciary duties.6 When merging two or more plans,
however, a plan sponsor will likely cancel the acquired corporation's investment
alternatives in its 401(k) plan. When plan sponsors select investment alterna-
midst of a 'merger wave."' Federal Trade Commission, Promoting Competition, Protecting Con-
sumers: A Plain English Guide to Antitrust Laws, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/mergers.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2002). "Over the past dec-
ade, the number of mergers reported to the FTC and the Justice Department has more than tripled,
increasing from 1,529 transactions in fiscal year 1991 to 4,642 in fiscal year 1999." SIMON M.
LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, I IA ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED
TRANSACTIONS § 7.2 (Supp. 2002).
4 A plan sponsor is the person or entity that establishes that plan for its employees. ERISA §
3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16)(B) (2001) (defining "plan sponsor"). In the case of a single em-
ployer who establishes or maintains an employee benefit plan, the plan sponsor is defined as the
employer. Id. The employer, however, is also given the status of "plan administrator" if none is
designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated. Id. § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii).
5 ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461, is the federal law governing most employer-
sponsored pension plans. It applies to "employee pension benefit plans," which are defined as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances
such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extend-
ing to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
Id. § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
6 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999) ("In general, an em-
ployer's decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself
and does not implicate the employer's fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the ad-
ministration of the plan's assets."); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) ("Plan
sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries."); Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) ("ERISA does not create any substantive
entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or any other kind of welfare benefits. Employers
or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, mod-
ify, or terminate welfare plans."); Letter from Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Secretary, Department of
Labor, to John N. Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986) (on file with author) ("In light of the voluntary nature
of the private pension system governed by ERISA, the Department [of Labor] has concluded that
there is a class of discretionary activities which relate to the formation, rather than the manage-
ment, of plans. These so-called 'settlor' functions include decisions relating to the establishment,
termination and design of plans and are not fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA.").
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tives for their participant-directed 401(k) plans, they act as fiduciaries and are
subject to the panoply of fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA.7 Does the
plan sponsor become a fiduciary by canceling these investment alternatives be-
cause it thereby selected (or, more appropriately, de-selected) investment alter-
natives for its 401(k) plan? Or does the plan sponsor remain a non-fiduciary
because it is simply amending or modifying a plan by merging its plan with the
acquired corporation's plan?
No case has definitively addressed the tension between these two black-
letter ERISA principles. Recently, however, in Franklin v. First Union Corp., 8
former participants in Signet Bank's 401(k) plan sued First Union after Signet
and its 401(k) plan were merged into First Union and the investment alternatives
in the Signet plan were cancelled. 9 The plaintiffs alleged that by treating the
Signet 401(k) plan investments in this manner, First Union selected investment
alternatives for the former Signet employees and thereby acted in a fiduciary
capacity.1°
This paper argues that courts construing a plan sponsor's duties in
merging participant-directed 401(k) plans should hold that no fiduciary duty
exists to examine the investment alternatives in the acquired company's 401(k)
plan. Part II of the paper summarizes ERISA's fiduciary duty requirements, the
requirements for retirement plans to qualify for the preferential tax treatment
provided by Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") § 401(k), and the requirements for
allowing participants to direct the investment of their assets under ERISA §
404(c). Part III examines the Franklin v. First Union Corp." litigation, specifi-
cally the allegations related to fiduciary duties of plan sponsors in the merger of
participant-directed 401(k) plans. Part IV analyzes the theories of fiduciary
responsibility advocated by the employee plaintiffs in First Union using courts'
usual methods of interpreting ERISA. Finally, based on the methods most
commonly used to interpret ERISA, Part V concludes that plan sponsors should
not be held to fiduciary standards when they cancel investment alternatives in
the participant-directed 401(k) plan of their merger partners.
7 See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 46906, 46924 n.27 (1992) ("In this regard, the Department points out
that the act of limiting or designating investment options that are intended to constitute all or part
of the investment universe of an ERISA 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function."); Department of
Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs Opinion 97-15A (May 22, 1997) (finding that bank
exercised "discretionary authority and control," and was thereby a "fiduciary" under ERISA §
3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2001), because the bank reserved the right to add or delete
mutual funds in which it allowed pension plans to invest). Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(a)(2)
(2002) (stating that standards in 404(c) regulation only apply to determine whether a plan is an
ERISA 404(c) plan and do not affect other fiduciary duties under ERISA).
8 84 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Va. 2000).
9 See infra Part III (discussing merger between First Union and Signet Bank, including
merger of participant-directed 401(k) plans of the companies).
10 See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
1 84 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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II. ERISA's FIDUCIARY DUTIES, PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED 401 (K) PLANS,
AND REQUIREMENTS UPON PLAN MERGER
Under ERISA, the fiduciary duties associated with selecting investment
alternatives for participant-directed 401(k) plans are different than the general
duties imposed on plan sponsors in the merger of pension plans. Therefore, it is
important to review each before examining whether the two overlap. This sec-
tion provides several preliminary definitions necessary to understand 401(k)
plans and the scope of fiduciary duties. The section then outlines the various
legal principles underpinning the concepts of fiduciary duties associated with




A "401(k)" plan is based on a "cash or deferred arrangement" or
"CODA."' 2 Under this arrangement, participants contribute a portion of their
salary to a qualified retirement plan 13 instead of having the cash paid directly to
them. 14 The amounts deferred by participants to the 401(k) plan are made on a
pre-tax basis (as opposed to having the amounts distributed directly to the par-
ticipants as wages, where they would be subject to immediate income taxa-
tion).15  Amounts so deferred by participants are called "elective contribu-
tions."16  Elective contributions are to be distinguished from both employer
matching contributions, which are contributions employers make to the 401(k)
12 Such plans are called "401(k) plans" because § 401(k) of the IRC authorizes this cash or
deferred arrangement.
13 A "qualified retirement plan" is "one that satisfies the requirements, in both form and opera-
tion, of the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." PAMELA PERDUE, QUALIFIED
PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS 1 1.01 (2d ed. 2001-2002). Such qualification requirements
are generally listed in § 401 (a) of the IRC.
14 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2001).
15 Thomas S. Gigot, 401(k) Plan Litigation under ERISA, 27 J. PENSION PLAN & COMPLIANCE
63 (Oct. 1, 2001).
16 Although elective contributions defer money that would otherwise be paid to the participant
as salary, the IRS considers them to be employer money. See PERDUE supra note 13, 1 17.05[3].
The Department of Labor, however, considers elective contributions to be the property of the
participant. Regulation Relating to Definition of "Plan Assets"-Participant Contributions, 61
Fed. Reg. 41220 n.I (August 7, 1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102) ("The Department's
view is that elective contributions to an employee benefit plan, whether made pursuant to a salary
reduction agreement or otherwise, constitute amounts paid to or withheld by an employer (i.e.,
participant contributions) within the scope of § 2510.3-102, without regard to the treatment of
such contributions under the Internal Revenue Code.").
2003]
5
Tyson: Is the Merger of Participant-Directed 401(K) Plans Subject to ERI
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
plan that are not elective contributions, and after-tax employee contributions,
which some 401(k) plans allow. 17
The types of qualified retirement plans that may provide for a 401(k)
feature include a profit-sharing plan,' 8 a stock bonus plan,' 9 a pre-ERISA money
purchase plan,20 or a rural cooperative plan.2' All of these types of plans, and
hence any 401(k) plan, are "defined contribution plans." A defined contribution
plan "means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the par-
ticipant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfei-
tures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such partici-
pant's account. 22  In a defined contribution plan, the ultimate benefit that will
result from such investments is not guaranteed.23
2. Fiduciary
a. The Functional and Transactional Nature of the
Definition of Fiduciary
Under ERISA, a person 24 is a fiduciary
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or dis-
cretionary control respecting management of such plan or exer-
cises any authority or control respecting management or dispo-
sition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any mon-
17 PERDUE, supra note 13, 17.05[3].
18 Id. at 1.05[ 1] (defining profit-sharing plan).
19 Id. at 1.05[9] (defining stock bonus plan).
20 A pre-ERISA money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution plan that: (1) was in
existence on June 27, 1974, (2) included a qualified salary reduction agreement, and (3) provides
for employer and participant contributions of amounts not in excess of that specified by the con-
tribution formula in the plan. I.R.C. § 401(k)(6) (2001).
21 A rural cooperative plan is a defined contribution plan established and maintained by a rural
cooperative. Id. § 401(k)(7); see also id. § 401(k)(7)(B) (defining "rural cooperative").
22 ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2001). The IRC defines a "defined contribution
plan" in almost the exact same language. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2001) (defining "defined contribution
plan").
23 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 364 n.5 (1980) ("[U]nder
such [defined contribution] plans, by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of funds in the
plan to cover promised benefits.").
24 ERISA defines a person as "an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual
company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or em-
ployee organization." ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9).
[Vol. 105
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eys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or re-
sponsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority
or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.25
This definition of "fiduciary," therefore, is "functional" because a person will be
a fiduciary (and hence subject to fiduciary duties under ERISA)26 based on the
actions he performs. "[T]he definition includes persons who have authority and
responsibility with respect to the matter in question, regardless of their formal
title., 27 Some persons are considered fiduciaries because of the position or title
they hold, but only because their title or position requires them to perform one
of the above-listed actions. For example, as noted by the Department of Labor,
an administrator of an employee benefit plan must, by the very nature of his
position, have "discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the ad-
ministration of the plan," and therefore is a fiduciary by reason of this authority
or responsibility. 28 Other positions, however, must be examined to determine
whether a person is performing one or more of the above-listed duties to deter-
mine whether he is a fiduciary and therefore subject to ERISA's fiduciary re-
quirements. 9
The definition of fiduciary under ERISA is also transactional. A person
is a fiduciary only with respect to specific transactions in which he acts in a fi-
duciary capacity. An individual who acts in a fiduciary capacity for some mat-
ters with respect to an employer may not be a fiduciary regarding other plan
matters for the same employer. The role of a member of a board of directors
illustrates this principle:
Members of the board of directors ... will be fiduciaries only to
the extent that they have responsibility for the functions de-
scribed in section 3(21)(A) of the Act. For example, the board
of directors may be responsible for the selection and retention
of plan fiduciaries. In such a case, members of the board of di-
rectors exercise "discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan" and are, therefore, fiduci-
aries with respect to the plan. However, their responsibility,
25 Id. § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
26 See, e.g., id. § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2001) (describing the general duties of fiduciaries).
27 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5038, 5103.
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and, consequently, their liability, is limited to the selection and
retention offiduciaries.30
Based on this interpretation of the definition of fiduciary, a person is a fiduciary
only when performing the functions listed in § 3(21)(A) of the statute, and only
with respect to the transactions in which he performs those functions.
b. Named Fiduciary
As stated above, some persons are ERISA fiduciaries because they are
named as such. A "named fiduciary" is
a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursu-
ant to a procedure specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduci-
ary (A) by a person who is an employer or employee organiza-
tion with respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and
such an employee organization acting jointly.3'
Under ERISA, every employee benefit plan must be "established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument. Such instrument shall provide for
one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to
control and manage the operation and administration of the plan. 32
3. Trustee
ERISA provides that one or more trustees must hold all assets of pen-
sion plans in trust.3 3 Although the trustee can be either named in the trust
document or appointed by the named fiduciary, the trustee must affirmatively
accept his position.34 Upon acceptance, the trustee is charged with the "exclu-
sive authority to manage and control the assets of the plan., 35 Generally, the
only exceptions to this grant of exclusive responsibility occur when (1) the pen-
sion plan expressly provides that the trustee is subject to the direction of the
named fiduciary and the named fiduciary provides the trustee with proper direc-
30 Id. at D-4 (emphasis added); see also Chicago Bd. of Options v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 713 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1982) ("It is important to remember that if Connecticut General is
a fiduciary because of the power to amend, this status only governs actions taken in regard to
amending the contract and does not impose fiduciary obligations upon Connecticut General when
taking other actions.") (citations omitted).
31 ERISA § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2001).
32 Id. § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
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tions made in accordance with the plan documents and which are not contrary to
the requirement of ERISA, or (2) "authority to manage, acquire, or dispose of
assets of the plan is delegated to one or more investment managers. 36 Because
of his exclusive authority to manage and control the assets of the plan, the trus-
tee will be a fiduciary who is subject to the fiduciary standards of ERISA when
dealing with the plan as a trustee. 
37
4. Participant-Directed 401 (k) Plans
Although the trustee, who is a fiduciary, has exclusive authority to man-
age and control the assets of a pension plan, ERISA § 404(c) relieves fiduciaries
of liability for plan investments if certain "safe harbor" conditions are met.38
Specifically, these conditions require: (1) that the participant or beneficiary be
given an opportunity to exercise control over the assets in his individual ac-
count, and (2) that the plan provides the participant or beneficiary the opportu-
nity to choose the manner in which his plan assets are allocated, where such
choice is allowed among a broad range of investment alternatives. 39 Plans satis-
fying these conditions are often termed "participant-directed 401(k) plans." 0
With respect to the "broad range" of investment alternatives available to
participants, there are generally three requirements that must be met for a plan to
qualify as an ERISA § 404(c) plan. First, the participant must be given an op-
portunity to affect materially the return on his account balance and the degree of
41
risk to which the account is subject. Second, the participant must be provided
an opportunity to choose from at least three diversified investment alternatives,
each with materially different risk and reward characteristics. 42 Third, the par-
36 Id.; see supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing definition and responsibilities of a "named fiduci-
ary"). An "investment manager" is a fiduciary with responsibility for the management and dispo-
sition of plan assets. The investment manager must be a registered investment manager under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, a bank, or an insurance company qualified to manage or dispose
of employee pension plan assets; the investment manager must acknowledge his status as a fiduci-
ary in writing. ERISA § 3(38); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (2001).
37 ERISA defines a fiduciary as any person who "exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of [pension plan] assets." ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21)(A).
38 Id. § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2001).
39 Id. § 404(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1 104(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2002).
40 Such plans are also called "ERISA section 404(c) plans" because § 404(c) and its accompa-
nying regulations describe the general requirements for these plans.
41 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b)(3).
42 Id. In the aggregate, these investment alternatives must permit the participant to achieve
risk and reward characteristics normally appropriate for the participant. Id. The individual in-
vestment alternatives must also, when combined with the other alternatives in the plan, minimize
overall risk of the portfolio through diversification. Id.
2003]
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ticipant must be given an opportunity to diversify his investments to minimize
the risk of large losses.43
B. Fiduciary Duties
1. General Fiduciary Duties with Respect to Investment of Assets
As discussed above, the responsibility for investing assets of the plan on
behalf of participants and beneficiaries rests with the trustee of the plan, who is
a fiduciary. 44 When a fiduciary invests plan assets, ERISA requires him to dis-
charge his duties solely in the interest of and for the exclusive benefit of partici-
pants and beneficiaries; he must also act with the care and skill of a prudent man
in similar circumstances. The fiduciary must also diversify the investments of
the plan to minimize the risk of large losses and discharge his duties in accor-
dance with the terms of the documents governing the plan.45 Failure to fulfill
such duties can result in a breach of fiduciary duty and liability for damages to
the plan.46
43 Id.
44 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45 ERISA § 404(a)(1) provides:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the in-
terest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter [subchapter I] and subchapter III of this
chapter.").
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2001).
Subchapter I of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1 191c (2001), provides rules for the
protection of employee benefit rights, while subchapter III establishes the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation and a plan termination insurance program.
46 Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2001); id. § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2001).
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2. Relief from Fiduciary Liability for Losses Resulting from the
Participant's Exercise of Control
In a participant-directed ERISA § 404(c) plan, however, the fiduciary is
not liable for losses that result from the participant's exercise of control over the
assets in the participant's account; moreover, the participant-despite his discre-
tion over the investment of plan assets-is not considered a fiduciary.47 The
fiduciary is nonetheless liable both for the investment alternatives offered to a
participant, as well as for periodic review of such investments to determine
whether to retain them as investment alternatives.48
This limited relief from liability for the fiduciary originates from the
Department of Labor's interpretation of the following statutory language: "[N]o
person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable .. .for any loss . . . which
results from [a] participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.'49 This relief
from liability extends only to losses that are "the direct and necessary result of
that participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control." 50 For example, if the
fiduciary does not offer the participant a broad range of investment alternatives,
then the 404(c) relief from liability is inapplicable and any resulting losses are
not based on the participant's exercise of control of the plan. Rather, the losses
result from the fiduciary's failure to offer an appropriately broad selection of
investment alternatives to minimize the risk of loss. "In other words, a plan
fiduciary can never avoid potential liability for negligence in picking the in-
vestments which constitute the 'menu' of investment alternatives made available
to participants under the plan or any investment advisor connected with such
investment alternatives. 51
C. General Plan Sponsor Duties
While ERISA and its accompanying regulations set forth the duties of
fiduciaries in all aspects of fiduciary activity in great detail,52 neither the statute
nor the regulations place responsibility on plan sponsors.53 A plan sponsor's
lack of responsibility emanates from the voluntary nature of the private pension
47 Id. § 404(c)(1)(A), (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A), (B); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(l), (2)
(2002). Without this specific declaration that the participant in control of the assets of his account
is not a fiduciary, any other fiduciary under the plan could be liable as a "co-fiduciary" for the
participant's losses or other breach of fiduciary duties. ERISA § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (2001).
48 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
49 ERISA § 404(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B).
50 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-I(d)(2).
51 Morton A. Harris, Working with Participant Directed Investments Under ERISA § 404(c),
SG008 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 887, 908-09 (2001).
52 See, e.g., ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
53 See supra note 4 (defining "plan sponsor" under ERISA and describing duties).
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system in the United States;54 ERISA does not require an employer to establish a
pension plan.55 Plan sponsors are therefore free to establish, modify, or termi-
56nate a plan at any time.
Plan sponsors, however, can "wear two hats" under ERISA by serving
as both a plan sponsor and a fiduciary.57 If a plan sponsor performs a fiduciary
act, that plan sponsor is a fiduciary to the extent of the fiduciary act performed.58
When acting in a fiduciary capacity, the plan sponsor must comply with
ERISA's fiduciary standards, including those applicable to selection of invest-
ment alternatives for a participant-directed 401 (k) plan.59
D. ERISA Requirements on Merger of Retirement Plans
Both ERISA and the IRC specify how plans covered under their respec-
tive provisions6° must be merged. 61 ERISA § 208 provides:
54 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA does not mandate that em-
ployers provide any particular benefits"); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73, 78 (1995) ("ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided
health benefits or any other kind of welfare benefits. Employers or other plan sponsors are gener-
ally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.").
55 Letter from Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor, to John N. Erlen-
born (Mar. 13, 1986) (on file with author) ("In light of the voluntary nature of the private pension
system governed by ERISA, the Department [of Labor] has concluded that there is a class of
discretionary activities which relate to the formation, rather than the management, of plans. These
so-called 'settlor' functions include decisions relating to the establishment, termination and design
of plans and are not fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA.").
56 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57 Belade v. IT Corp., 909 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("ERISA permits em-
ployers to wear 'two hats,' and [employers] assume fiduciary status 'only when and to the extent
that they function in their capacity as plan administrators, not when they conduct business that is
not regulated by ERISA."') (quoting Amato v. Western Union Int'l, 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
58 See supra Part II.A.2.a. (discussing functional and transactional nature of fiduciary defini-
tion).
59 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-4 (2002) ("Members of the board of directors of an employer
which maintains an employee benefit plan will be fiduciaries only to the extent that they have
responsibility for the functions described in section 3(21 )(A) of the Act [defining "fiduciary"].").
60 ERISA generally applies to "employee welfare benefit plans" and "employee pension bene-
fit plans," as those terms are defined in the Act. ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2001) (defining
coverage of ERISA); see also id. § 3(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2) (2001) (defining employee
welfare benefit plan and employee pension benefit plan); supra note 5 (defining "employee pen-
sion benefit plan"); infra note 115 (defining "employee welfare benefit plan"). Unlike ERISA, the
IRC does not apply to specific types of employee benefit plans; rather, it establishes the require-
ments for plans to be considered "qualified," meaning that they are eligible for favorable tax
treatment to the plan sponsor, the plan participants, and the trust containing plan assets. I.R.C. §
401(a) (2001) (listing qualification requirements for qualified plans); id. § 402(a) (2001) (provid-
ing exemption from taxation for plan participants with respect to contributions to plan); id. §
404(a) (2001) (providing deduction to plan sponsor for contributions to qualified plan); id. §
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A pension plan may not merge or consolidate with, or transfer
its assets or liabilities to, any other plan ... unless each partici-
pant in the plan would (if the plan then terminated) receive a
benefit immediately after the merger, consolidation, or transfer
which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would have been
entitled to receive immediately before the merger, consolida-
tion, or transfer (if the plan had then terminated).
Likewise, § 414(l) of the IRC provides that a plan is not "qualified ' 63 unless
in the case of any merger or consolidation of the plan with, or in
the case of any transfer of assets or liabilities of such plan to,
any other trust plan.., each participant in the plan would (if the
plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the
merger, consolidation, or transfer which is equal to or greater
than the benefit he would have been entitled to receive immedi-
ately before the merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the plan
had then terminated).64
The Treasury regulations interpreting ERISA 65 § 208 and IRC § 414(l)
explicitly provide the requirements for merger of defined contribution plans,
including 401(k) plans:
In the case of a merger of two or more defined contribution
plans, the requirements of section 414(1) will be satisfied if all
of the following conditions are met:
(1) The sum of the account balances in each plan equals
the fair market value (determined as of the date of the
merger) of the entire plan assets.
501 (a) (2001) (providing exemption from taxation for trust holding qualified plan assets); see also
supra note 13 (defining "qualified retirement plan").
61 A "merger" of pension plans means "the combining of two or more plans into a single
plan." Treas. Reg. § 1.414(l)-1(b)(2) (2002).
62 ERISA § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (2001).
63 See supra note 13 (defining "qualified retirement plan").
64 I.R.C. § 414(l)(1) (2001).
65 "In the ERISA Reorganization Plan of 1978 the Treasury Department was assigned respon-
sibility for issuing regulations under certain provisions of ERISA, including § 1058. Thus, 'all
regulations implementing the provisions of [§§ 1058 and 414(l)] have been promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury, mostly under §414(1) of the Internal Revenue Code."' Malia v. General
Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 828, 832 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1994) (quoting Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 608 F.
Supp. 13, 25 n.3 (D.N.J. 1984)).
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(2) The assets of each plan are combined to form the as-
sets of the plan as merged.
(3) Immediately after the merger, each participant in the
plan as merged has an account balance equal to the sum of
the account balances the participant had in the plans imme-
diately prior to merger.66
III. FRANKLIN V. FIRST UNION CORP. LITIGATION
A. General Background of the Merger of Signet Bank and First Union
In Franklin v. First Union Corp.,67 the concepts of (1) plan sponsors'
lack of fiduciary duties when terminating or modifying a plan, and (2) the fidu-
ciary nature of selection of investment alternatives, came crashing together. The
First Union case arose after the 1997 merger of First Union Corporation, a
North Carolina-based banking corporation, and Signet Bank, a Virginia-based
68banking corporation.
Prior to the merger, the employees of Signet Bank were participants in
the Signet Banking Corporation Employee Savings Plan (the "Signet Plan"), a
401(k) plan.69 The Signet Plan was administered by a committee (the "Signet
Committee") comprised of members appointed by Signet's board of directors.7°
The Signet Plan provided that the Signet Committee was to select the various
investment alternatives in which participants could invest. In selecting these
alternatives, the Signet Committee was to comply with ERISA's § 404(c) regu-
lations so that the plan would be participant-directed. 7' The Committee initially
selected seven investment alternatives for the Signet Plan: (1) the Signet Com-
mon Stock Fund, 72 (2) the Vanguard Index 500 Trust Portfolio, 73 (3) the Ameri-
can Century/Twentieth Century Ultra Investors Fund,74 (4) the Virtus Treasury
Money Market Fund, (5) the Virtus Stable Value Fund, (6) the Virtus U.S. Gov-
ernment Securities Fund, and (7) the Virtus Style Manager.75 At a later date, the
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.414(1)- 1 (d) (2002).
67 84 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Va. 2000).
68 Id. at 722-23.
69 Id. at 721-22.
70 Id. at 721.
71 Id. at 722.
72 Id. This was a stock fund that invested solely in Signet common stock. Id.
73 This was a mutual fund that invested in the Standard and Poor's 500 Index. Id.
74 This was also a mutual fund. Id.
75 Id. The Virtus funds were proprietary mutual funds of Signet. Id.
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Signet Committee added an eighth option, the Capital One Stock Fund.7 6 This
fund invested solely in the stock of Capital One Financial Corporation, a sub-
sidiary of Signet Bank whose stock was "spun-off' to Signet Bank sharehold-
ers.
7 7
Like Signet, First Union maintained a 401(k) plan for its employees,
known as the "First Union Plan. 78 The First Union Plan offered participants
seven investment alternatives into which they could invest their retirement
funds; these alternatives were all proprietary funds operated by First Union.79
B. The Merger of the Signet and First Union 401(k) Plans
As part of the merger of the two corporations, First Union transferred
the assets of the Signet Plan to the First Union Plan.80 To facilitate this transfer,
there was a "black-out" period of approximately three weeks during which Sig-
net Plan participants could not alter the investment alternatives into which their
retirement funds were invested. 8' Each participant's former investment choices
under the Signet Plan were "mapped" into four of the seven funds available un-
der the First Union Plan.82 "When the 'black-out' period ended, former Signet
76 Id.
77 Franklin v. First Union Corp., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on Count IV, p. 5, at http://www.signetsuit.com/DefendantCountIVBrief.doc
(last visited April 28, 2002) ("[Tlhe Signet shares held by the Signet plan received a pro rata dis-
tribution of the shares of Cap[ital] One in the spin-off and were maintained under the Signet Plan
in a separate fund.... In other words, the Signet Plan did not acquire the Cap[ital] One stock by
an affirmative decision of its fiduciaries, but rather automatically as a shareholder of Signet
Bank.").
78 Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 721-22 (E.D. Va. 2000).
79 Id. at 724; see also Cynthia A. Van Bogaert and Jeffrey J. Storch, First Union and Plan
Mergers, 7 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TAX J. 235, 236 (March/April 2000).
80 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
81 Id. at 724-25. The black-out period lasted from December 23, 1997 until February 17,
1998. Id. at 725. The purpose of the black-out period was to "transfer the assets of the Signet
Plan into the First Union Plan and get [the assets] 'online' with First Union's telephonic admini-
stration system so the former Signet Plan participants could move their funds telephonically
among investment options if they chose." Franklin v. First Union Corp., Memorandum in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV, p. 5, at
http://www.signetsuit.com/DefendantCountIVBrief.doc (last visited April 28, 2002).
82 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 724. "Mapping" refers to the process of selecting replacement
funds in which to place assets formerly held in another fund that is no longer available as a result
of the merger. Van Bogaert and Storch, supra note 79, at 236. The Capital One Stock Fund, the
Virtus Stable Value Fund, and the Virtus Treasury Money Market Funds were mapped into the
First Union Stable Fund; the Signet Company Stock Fund was mapped into the First Union Com-
mon Stock Fund; the Virtus U.S. Government Securities fund was mapped into the Evergreen
U.S. Government Fund; and the Vanguard Index 500 Trust, the American Century Ultra Investors
Fund and the Virtus Style Manager Fund were mapped into the First Union Enhanced Stock Mar-
ket Fund. Franklin v. First Union Corp., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
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Plan participants were limited to the First Union-proprietary investment vehicles
offered under the First Union Plan."83 Signet participants were, however, al-
lowed to alter the investments in their accounts among these First Union pro-
prietary funds.84
C. Claims of the Former Signet Employees
As a result of the merger of the Signet Bank and First Union Plans and
First Union's cancellation of the investment alternatives available in the former
Signet Plan, nine former employees of Signet Bank85 filed a class-action lawsuit
against First Union and various other defendants ("Franklin 1,,).86 The com-
plaint alleged, inter alia, that the Signet Plan participants had a vested right to
the investment alternatives in the Signet Plan87 and that "the First Union defen-
dants breached their fiduciary duties in liquidating participants' investments in
the Signet Plan and in discontinuing its non-proprietary investment [alterna-
tives]. ' ' 8 The plaintiffs' allegations that First Union failed to examine any of
the investment alternatives in the Signet Plan were further fueled by their allega-
tions in a separate lawsuit, also against First Union.89 The allegations in the
Summary Judgment on Count IV, p. 4, at
http://www.signetsuit.com/DefendantCountIVBrief.doc (last visited April 28, 2002); see also
Van Bogaert and Storch, supra note 79, at 240 Ex. 1 (showing mapping of Signet Plan investment
alternatives into First Union Plan investment alternatives).
83 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
84 Id.; see also Van Bogaert and Storch, supra note 79, at 236.
85 Either Signet Banking Corporation or its wholly-owned subsidiary, Signet Bank, formerly
employed the plaintiffs. Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 721. For simplicity, this paper will refer to
these two business entities as "Signet Bank."
86 The defendants were First Union Corporation, a bank holding company; First Union Na-
tional Bank, a wholly-owned subsidiary of First Union Corporation; Capital Management Group,
a division of First Union National Bank; the First Union Corporation Savings Plan, a 401(k) sav-
ings plan organized for First Union Corporation's employees nationwide; and the First Union
Savings Plan Administration Committee, the plan administrator of the First Union Corporation
Savings Plan. Id. at 721-22.
87 Id. at 726. This allegation is contained in Count III of the Complaint. Id.
88 Id. This allegation is contained in Count IV of the Complaint. Id. Count I of the Com-
plaint alleged that the amendment to the Signet 401(k) plan (merging it with the First Union Plan)
was not adopted in conformity with the documents governing the Signet 401(k) plan, and was
therefore void. Id. Count II alleged that even if the amendment was valid, the Signet 401(k) plan
terminated and did not merge with the First Union 401(k) plan. Id. Count V alleged that certain
Signet Plan participants did not receive notice or received inadequate notice of the changes to the
Signet Plan and their fight to opt out of these changes. Id.
89 Franklin v. First Union Corp., No. 99-CV-610 (E.D. Va. filed September 7, 1999) (hereinaf-
ter "Franklin II"). The defendants in Franklin II were First Union Corporation, First Union Sav-
ings Plan Administration Committee, First Union National Bank, and First Union Corporate Sav-
ings Plan. Id., Comp.
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second lawsuit included claims that First Union engaged in self-dealing90 and
that benefits of the plan improperly inured9' to First Union 92 because the only
investment alternatives offered were those proprietary to First Union.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the allegations
in Franklin I, except the allegation that they breached their fiduciary duties by
liquidating the investment alternatives in the Signet Plan.93 The district court
granted the First Union Defendants partial summary judgment, specifically
holding that the participants did not have a vested right to the investment alter-
natives in the Signet Plan.94 The court relied on a Treasury regulation excluding
"the right to a particular form of investment (e.g., investment in employer stock
or securities or investment in certain types of securities, commercial paper, or
other investment media)"95 as an accrued benefit under ERISA that could not be
reduced or altered.96 The court further noted that responsibility for selecting
investment alternatives rested with the plan fiduciaries, who had both the re-
sponsibility and authority under Department of Labor regulations to remove
investment alternatives. 97 The court reasoned that because the § 404(c) regula-
90 Id., Comp. ERISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2002) provides: "A fiduciary with re-
spect to a plan shall not deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account."
91 Franklin II, supra note 89, Comp. ERISA § 403(c) provides: "[T]he assets of a plan shall
never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of provid-
ing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan." ERISA § 403(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2002).
92 These allegations were resolved as part of the global settlement of both Franklin I and
Franklin II. See Franklin II, supra note 89, Settlement, at
http://firstunionsuit.comSettlement.html (last visited April 28, 2002). Allegations similar to those
made in Franklin II were made in Mehling v. New York Life Insurance Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 502
(E.D. Pa. 2001). In Mehling, the court granted defendant New York Life summary judgment on
plaintiffs' claims that it breached its fiduciary duty by providing only investment alternatives in its
own proprietary funds. 163 F. Supp. 2d at 502. The court held that while ERISA § 406 "prohibits
fiduciaries from involving plan assets in various acts of self-dealing or conflicts of interest," a
specific exemption from these rules issued by the Secretary of Labor applied to New York Life's
investments in its proprietary funds. Id. at 510 (discussing Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-
3). Further discussion of the Franklin II case is beyond the scope of this article.
93 The First Union Defendants later moved for summary judgment as to Count IV of the Com-
plaint. Franklin v. First Union Corp., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on Count IV, p. 4, at http//www.signetsuit.conDefendantCountIVBrief.doc
(last visited April 28, 2002).
94 Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 736 (E.D. Va. 2000). The court also
granted Defendants summary judgment on Counts I and II and denied them summary judgment on
Count V. Id.; see supra notes 87-88 (describing allegations contained in these Counts).
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.41 l(d)-4(A-1)(d)(7) (2002).
96 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 731. Under ERISA's "anti-cutback rule" an accrued benefit
"may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan." ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1)
(2001).
97 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 731-32. Under the preamble to the § 404(c) regulations, prom-
ulgated, by the Department of Labor, the plan fiduciary has the obligation "to determine . . .
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tions place the responsibility on the plan fiduciary for periodically evaluating
the various investment alternatives that are available to participants in a § 404(c)
plan, the "plan fiduciary has the responsibility for selecting investment alterna-
tives and, by definition, has authority to remove alternatives." 98 Finally, the
court relied on the Signet Plan's express language allowing addition and dele-
tion of investment alternatives to the plan.99
The court did not address whether First Union breached a fiduciary duty
by liquidating the Signet employees' investments in the Signet Plan when it was
merged with the First Union Plan because the First Union Defendants did not
move for summary judgment on this issue. °° Interestingly, however, the court
noted that, despite its grant of summary judgment to the First Union defendants
on Count III (alleging a vested right to the investment alternatives in the Signet
Plan), such a ruling "does not ... foreclose plaintiffs' claims in Count IV that
the defendants breached their fiduciary duties in liquidating participants' in-
vestments in the Signet Plan and discontinuing the non-proprietary investment
options. ' 1° Prior to any ruling by the court on the First Union Defendants' later
motion for summary judgment on Count IV of the Complaint, the lawsuit was
settled. 102
IV. ANALYSIS OF THEORIES OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATED
BY FIRST UNION PLAINTIFFS
The First Union plaintiffs' claims, while possessing an inherent com-
mon-sense and fairness appeal, should be rejected in favor of a bright line stan-
dard that a plan sponsor does not become a fiduciary when it merges 401(k)
plans in the context of a larger corporate merger without considering the in-
vestment alternatives in an acquired corporation's 401(k) plan.
whether the [investment alternatives] should continue to be available as participant investment
options." 57 Fed. Reg. 46906, 46924 n.27 (Oct. 12 1992).
98 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
99 Id. at 732-33. The Signet Plan stated: "The Committee may add to or reduce the number
and type of Investment Funds that will be available for investment in any Plan Year. The Com-
mittee shall select the Investment Funds in accordance with ERISA section 404(c) and the regula-
tions thereunder." Id. at 732 (quoting Signet Banking Corporation Employee Savings Plan §
8.3(b)).
100 Id. at 726. Defendants later moved for summary judgment with respect to Count IV of the
Complaint. See supra note 93.
101 Franklin, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 733 n.6.
102 Morton A. Harris, Working with Participant Directed Investments Under ERISA § 404(c),
SG008 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 887, 939 (2001); see also Signet Plan Litigation Website, at http://www.
signetsuit.com (last visited March 17, 2002).
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The federal courts have considered several factors in determining the
meaning and scope of ERISA. First, courts have looked to its plain language.1
0 3
Specifically, courts have examined the structure of the Act as a whole when
construing its language, although simultaneously cautioning against reading the
requirements of one section into another because separate sections may have
had different purposes or Congressional concerns when enacted.' °4 As part of
their examination of the structure of ERISA, courts have attempted to read and
interpret it to ensure internal consistency.'0 5 Second, Courts have been loath to
impose extra-textual remedies under ERISA because of its carefully balanced
and comprehensive remedial scheme. 106
Third, courts have looked to the legislative history of ERISA, specifi-
cally, Congress's public policy concerns in enacting ERISA. While Congress's
overarching purpose for the Act was to protect employee pension plans, Con-
gress also wished to encourage employers to establish pension plans and was
concerned that over-regulation of the plans would discourage employers from
doing so.' 0 7 Courts have therefore been wary of proposed interpretations or
constructions of ERISA that would create a burden on employers, especially
where they would not otherwise advance ERISA's beneficent purposes.
A. Plain Language of the Act
1. Interpreting ERISA's Fiduciary Duties in Light of the Structure
of the Act
A person who selects investment alternatives for a participant-directed
401(k) plan acts in a fiduciary capacity and must conform that activity to
ERISA's fiduciary standards because of the functional nature of the definition of
"fiduciary" under ERISA. 0 8 Other sections of ERISA, however, specifically set
out the requirements for merging plans.1°9 Because these different duties are in
103 See infra Part IV.A; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (inter-
preting ERISA in light of "the relevant text.., the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative
history.").
104 See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995) ("[W]e do not think
Congress intended [one part of the statute] to be supplemented by a faraway provision in another
part of the statute, least of all in a way that would lead to improbable results."); Mass. Mut. Life,
473 U.S. at 148.
105 Mass. Mut. Life, 473 U.S. at 148.
106 See infra note 124 and Part IV.B.
107 See infra Part IV.C. 1.
108 See supra note 7.
109 ERISA § 208 provides: "A pension plan may not merge or consolidate with ... any other
plan ... unless each participant in the plan would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit
immediately after the merger ... which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would have been
entitled to receive immediately before the merger." ERISA § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (2001).
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different parts of the Act, they should not be read as modifying each other."0
Indeed, ERISA § 208, the section specifying the requirements for merging
plans, contains a specific exemption if participants are covered by a multiem-
ployer plan governed by subchapter III of ERISA.I"' That is, Congress specifi-
cally exempted multiemployer plans from the general merger requirements.
Had Congress likewise wanted to make exceptions from or impose duties other
than those specifically enumerated in § 208-including imposing fiduciary du-
ties upon plan sponsors-it could have done so.112
2. Interpreting ERISA to Avoid Internal Inconsistency with
Respect to Participants' Rights to Investment Alternatives
The court in Franklin v. First Union Corp. specifically held that the
former Signet Plan participants had no vested right to the investment alterna-
tives in the Signet Plan.' 13 A holding that a plan sponsor has a fiduciary duty to
investigate investment alternatives in an acquired company's 401(k) plan, how-
ever, will de facto create such a right. If the investment alternatives in the ac-
quired corporation's 401(k) are outperforming the current investment alterna-
tives in the acquirer's 401(k), the fiduciary will feel compelled to examine the
acquired corporation's investment alternatives and add them to the investment
alternatives already existing in the acquirer's plan. Failure to do so would lead
to allegations that the fiduciary did not examine the investment alternatives con-
sistent with fiduciary duties." 4 This allegation would have almost immediate
credence in a circumstance (like the one present in First Union) where the in-
110 The United States Supreme Court has previously used such a structural analysis of ERISA's
various sections to hold that different sections of ERISA should not be read as overlapping unless
Congress clearly intended them to do so. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
73, 84 (1995) ('This may not be a foolproof informational scheme, although it is quite thorough.
Either way, it is the scheme that Congress devised. And we do not think Congress intended it to
be supplemented by a faraway provision in another part of the statute, least of all in a way that
would lead to improbable results."); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51
(1987) (construing ERISA and stating: "in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a sin-
gle sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy").
II ERISA § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 1058 ("The preceding sentence shall not apply to any transaction
to the extent that participants either before or after the transaction are covered under a multiem-
ployer plan to which subchapter III of this chapter applies."); see supra note 45 (describing gener-
ally functions of subchapter III of ERISA).
112 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) ("We must give effect to this plain
language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some
more restrictive meaning.").
1"3 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing district court's holding that for-
mer Signet employees had no vested right to investment alternatives in the Signet Plan).
114 See supra note 7 (describing fiduciary duties of persons selecting investment alternatives in
ERISA § 404(c) plan); supra Part II.B (describing fiduciary standards in general).
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vestment alternatives at issue were outperforming those in the acquirer's plan.
A fiduciary facing such allegations-where the damages can already be calcu-
lated as the difference between the better-performing investment of the acquired
company and the performance of the existing funds of the acquirer company-
may add the funds simply to avoid litigation and potential damages.
Although discussing welfare benefits," 5 the Sixth Circuit addressed a
similar argument in Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc." 6 In that case, several
former employees sued Avondale Industries, claiming, inter alia, that its at-
tempted amendment of an unwritten severance plan was invalid because "Con-
gress intended to foreclose amendment or termination of all benefit plans except
where such action would be in the interests of plan participants."
' 17
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, explaining that Congress
specifically chose not to require vesting of welfare benefits because the costs of
such vesting would discourage employers from establishing welfare benefit
plans. The court reasoned:
In drawing the line between employer actions subject to the fi-
duciary duty requirement and those not, we must avoid any rule
that would have the effect of undermining Congress' considered
decision that welfare benefit plans not be subject to a vesting
requirement. We are compelled, therefore, to reject plaintiffs'
proposed rule that welfare benefit plans such as the one before
us be amended or terminated only when such action would be in
the best interests of the employees. To adopt such a require-
ment would, in effect, accord employees a vested right to wel-
fare benefits, thereby upsetting ERISA 's delicate balance in this
area. Instead, we employ the rule ... that a company does not
act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminate
a welfare benefits plan." 
8
15 ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer...
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ... medi-
cal, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice-
ship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or pre-
paid legal services.
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2001). Welfare benefit plan administrators are required to
comply with ERISA's fiduciary requirements and reporting and disclosure requirements, but are
exempted from the participation, funding, and vesting sections of ERISA. ERISA §§ 201, 301, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1081 (2001); Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990).
116 905 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1990).
117 Id. at 946.
118 Id. at 947 (emphasis added).
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As the Sixth Circuit held in Avondale Industries with respect to welfare
benefits, creating a de facto right by expanding the plan sponsor's duties in a
merger would undermine ERISA's lack of a vesting requirement for investment
alternatives. 119
Moreover, such a right would have several negative effects that would
conflict with other fiduciary duties under ERISA. First, requiring the fiduciary
to consider (and likely implement) another investment alternative simply be-
cause it is currently performing well in the marketplace will interfere with the
fiduciary's duty to ensure diversity in the investment alternatives and would
create additional burdens of administration in attempting to comply with the
ERISA § 404(c) regulations. 120 The fiduciary is already under a duty to examine
the appropriateness of the investment alternatives in the acquirer's portfolio on a
regular basis to ensure that they are proper.
121
Second, requiring the fiduciary to examine an acquired corporation's
investment alternatives would make this activity subject to the happenchance
event of corporate activity. That is, if a company happens to merge, then the
fiduciary is saddled with the additional burden of reviewing the acquired com-
pany's 401(k) investment alternatives temporally proximate to the merger. Of
course, the fiduciary may have recently reviewed the investment alternatives of
the acquirer company or may plan to do so in the near future as part of his duty
to review the investment alternatives periodically to ensure that they continue to
meet the ERISA § 404(c) regulation requirements. 122 If subject to ERISA's
fiduciary standards, the merger would require further examination of other al-
ternatives in addition to the usual activity of the fiduciary. Such extra examina-
tion of investment alternatives would not depend on ERISA or any Department
of Labor regulation; rather, it would depend solely on whether the corporation
happened to merge at a given time. Following this line of logic, a corporation
that happened to merge three times in one year would have to examine the in-
vestment alternatives offered to participants three times more than would a cor-
poration that did not merge at all during the year. This contravenes the cer-
tainty, predictability, and uniformity that Congress sought to achieve through
passage of ERISA. 1
23
119 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing holding by district court in First
Union that ERISA does not provide plan participants with a vested right to investment alterna-
tives).
120 See supra Part II.A.4 (describing range of investment alternatives that must be available for
participants and beneficiaries under a plan that wishes to comply with ERISA's 404(c) "safe har-
bor" regulation).
121 See supra note 7.
122 See id.
123 Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) ("Congress intended ... to
establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern."); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, reprinted in 2 SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2359 (Comm. Print
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B. Courts' Reluctance to Impose Additional Remedies Under ERISA
Courts are loath to impose extra-textual remedies124 because of the de-
tailed remedial scheme promulgated under ERISA.125 Adopting the First Union
plaintiffs' argument that ERISA's fiduciary duties apply to plan mergers would
impose such an extra-textual remedy. If an employer chooses to comply with
1976) ("The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster will help administrators,
fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of
reference to varying state laws.").
124 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985) ("The federal judiciary will
not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to pro-
vide."); id. at 146-47 ("The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in §502(a)
of the statue as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly .... We are reluctant to
tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA."); Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("[W]here a statute expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.").
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon
Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000), is consistent with this principle. In Harris Trust, a trus-
tee of a pension plan sought to rescind a sale of motel properties between the plan and Salomon,
despite Salomon's status as a non-fiduciary under ERISA. 530 U.S. at 243. The trustee also
sought restitution of the purchase price and disgorgement of any profits made by Salomon on the
transaction. Id. The Court held that ERISA § 502(a)(3)'s authorization of "appropriate equitable
relief' allowed the trustee to seek such equitable relief from a non-fiduciary. Id. at 241. In so
holding, the Court first noted that "ERISA's 'comprehensive and reticulated' scheme warrants a
cautious approach to inferring remedies not expressly authorized by the text." Id. at 247 (internal
citations omitted). The Court found, however, that this type of equitable relief against a non-
fiduciary was, in fact, authorized by the text of the Act. Id. at 247 ("In this case, however, §502(l)
resolves the matter-it compels the conclusion [that the above-described relief was appropriate
against a non-fiduciary]."); see also id. at 247-49 (examining statutory text).
Moreover, the primary questions before the respective courts in Harris Trust and First
Union were dissimilar. In Harris Trust, the Court addressed whether a non-fiduciary was an
appropriate defendant under ERISA § 502(a)(3). Id. at 241 ("The question [before the Court] is
whether [§ 502(a)(3)'s authorization of appropriate equitable relief] extends to a suit against a
non-fiduciary [party]."). No allegation was made in Harris Trust that Salomon was a fiduciary, as
that term is defined in ERISA.
In First Union, the plaintiffs asked a fundamentally different question: whether a non-
fiduciary (a plan settlor) became a fiduciary when it merged two participant-directed 401 (k) plans.
In other words, Harris Trust asked, "is a non-fiduciary a proper defendant?" while First Union
asked, "When does a person become a fiduciary in the context of the merger of participant-
directed 401(k) plans?"
See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002) (holding
that where plaintiffs sought "legal relief-the imposition of personal liability on respondents for a
contractual obligation to pay money," plaintiffs were not seeking "equitable relief' and hence
Harris Trust was inapplicable).
125 ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2001) (describing liability of person for breach of fiduci-
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the Department of Labor's § 404(c) regulations, ERISA promises participants
investment alternatives with certain characteristics from which participants may
choose. 126 The First Union plaintiffs, however, did not ask for a fund with in-
vestment alternatives that complied with the ERISA § 404(c) regulations (which
they nonetheless received when they were allowed to participate in the First
Union Plan). Rather, they asked for the right to a portfolio of their own choos-
ing: one that included funds they felt would yield superior performance. Provid-
ing participants a right to demand a portfolio of their own choosing-and allow-
ing them to recover damages for the failure to provide it-is providing a remedy
not contemplated by ERISA for denial of a benefit that ERISA does not recog-
nize.
Notably, the former Signet employees were still protected by ERISA.
In compliance with the § 404(c) regulations, First Union had to offer partici-
pants at least three investment alternatives that were diversified individually and
in the aggregate, that provided participants an opportunity to materially affect
the return and risk on their accounts, and that allowed the participants to diver-
sify their investments and thereby minimize the risk of large losses. 127 That is,
the participants were provided with an opportunity to invest in alternative in-
vestments that both Congress and the Department of Labor felt were appropriate
under the circumstances. Failure on the part of First Union to offer such an ar-
ray of appropriate investments would have resulted in the First Union Plan not
qualifying under § 404(c) 128 and potential liability for failure to meet such regu-
lations.129 The fiduciary provided participants with a periodic review of the
investment alternatives offered as part of his duty to ensure that the array of
available alternatives continued to meet the regulations.' 30  Accordingly, the
Signet Plan participants were already sufficiently protected to ensure that Con-
gress's and the Department of Labor's mandates concerning investment of re-
tirement funds were met. The First Union plaintiffs simply sought to add an-
other protection and another remedy to that which ERISA already provides.
126 See supra Part II.A.4 (describing requirements of investment alternatives offered to partici-
pants under an ERISA § 404(c) plan).
127 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (2002).
128 Id. § 2550.404c-I(a)(2) ("The standards set forth in this section are applicable solely for the
purpose of determining whether a plan is an ERISA section 404(c) plan.").
129 Failure to meet the requirements of § 404(c) regulations would mean that the trustee would
otherwise be liable for any losses caused by breach of his fiduciary duties. ERISA § 409, 29
U.S.C. § 1109 (2001).
130 See supra note 7.
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C. Purposes of ERISA
1. Balancing ERISA's Goals of Protecting Employee Pension
Plans with Its Desire to Encourage Employers to Establish Such
Plans
The central purpose of Congress in passing ERISA was to protect em-
ployees' pension plans.' 31 Congress, however, also wished to encourage em-
ployers to sponsor pension plans for their employees. 132 Should courts interpret
ERISA's fiduciary duties to include plan mergers, they would violate both these
Congressional purposes.
First, such an interpretation would not enhance Congress's central pur-
pose of protecting employee pension plans. As discussed above, the former
Signet Plan participants were still protected by ERISA and were provided all
rights that ERISA guarantees under the § 404(c) regulations. Second, such an
interpretation would defeat Congress's companion purpose of encouraging em-
ployers to establish employee pension plans. By creating additional administra-
tive burdens and exposure to large litigation damages in the event of a merger,
courts would discourage employers from establishing or maintaining pension
plans for their employees. An interpretation so at odds with two of the central
purposes of ERISA is not plausible.
131 ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2001) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this
chapter to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries
of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, re-
sponsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appro-
priate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.").
132 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (stating that in interpreting ERISA's fidu-
ciary duties, "courts may have to take account of competing congressional purposes, such as Con-
gress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on
the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation
expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.")
(citations omitted); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("[T]he detailed provi-
sions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful
balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest
in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 148 n. 17 (1985) ("Indeed, Congress was concerned lest the cost of federal standards
discourage the growth of private pension plans."); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 515 (1981) ("[T]he House Ways and Means Committee expressly acknowledged the tension
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2. Providing a Uniform Interpretation of Employer Duties and
Employee Rights with Respect to Pension Plans
Another purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform set of rules and regu-
lations to govern pension plans. 33 Granting the First Union plaintiffs their in-
terpretation of the statute does not foster uniformity, but rather leaves fiduciary
duties to the whim of the stock market. Depending on whether the stock or fund
in the acquired company's 401(k) plan is up or down in the market on a given
day will in large part determine whether a fiduciary duty exists to consider that
investment alternative as part of the merger of the employee pension plans. If
an investment alternative in the acquired company's portfolio is not performing
as well as the investment alternatives in the acquiring company's portfolio, it is
unlikely that participants would question a fiduciary's rejection of such fund.' 34
On the other hand, if an investment alternative out-performs one or more of the
investment alternatives in the acquiring company's portfolio, participants would
likely claim that the fiduciary had a duty to consider such funds. Because one of
the important goals of ERISA is to provide a comprehensive statute that deals
uniformly with pension plans and fiduciary duties, leaving the existence of such
duties to the capricious nature of the marketplace is less than idealistic. Indeed,
the facts of the First Union case illustrate this admonition. If the First Union-
Signet merger occurred one year later, the investment alternatives that the for-
mer Signet Plan participants attempted to recapture via litigation would have
under-performed the investment alternatives in the First Union Plan.'
35
V. CONCLUSION: TERMINATION OF INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES IN
MERGED 401(K) PLANS Is NOT SUBJECT TO ERISA's FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In light of these customary guideposts for construction of ERISA, courts
should reject arguments labeling a plan sponsor as a fiduciary simply because
the sponsor eliminates an acquired corporation's 401(k) investment alternatives
in merging the sponsor's 401(k) with the plan of the acquired corporation.
Courts should instead establish a bright-line rule that there is no fiduciary activ-
ity on the part of the plan sponsor via such conduct.
The simplicity of the First Union plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of
ERISA, which would require plan sponsors to act as fiduciaries when merging
133 See supra note 123.
134 A fiduciary is liable to the plan only for losses or damages caused to the plan that result
from the breach of the fiduciary's duties. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2001) ("[A] fiduci-
ary ... who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries..
. shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach.") (emphasis added).
135 Franklin v. First Union Corp., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on Count IV, pp. 12, 16, at http://www.signetsuit.com/DefendantCount IV
Brief.doc (last visited April 28, 2002).
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401(k) plans, is inherently appealing. The First Union plaintiffs asked only that
First Union, as plan sponsor, look at the Signet Plan's funds and their perform-
ance prior to unilaterally eliminating them. If such funds were not appropriate,
then they could be eliminated as investment options; on the other hand, if such
funds were superior to those offered in the First Union Plan, what reason would
First Union have for not wanting its employees to have the benefit of such supe-
rior-performing funds?
What this argument has in simplicity, however, it lacks in substance.
The perceived substantive evil of a plan sponsor not being required to examine a
merger partner's 401(k) investment alternatives is just that: perceived. ERISA
promises neither a perfect selection of 401(k) investment alternatives nor one of
the participant's choosing; indeed, ERISA promises no retirement plan at all.
ERISA instead promises that if the plan sponsor wishes to comply with the §
404(c) regulations, the trustee must provide a diversified portfolio of investment
alternatives; the Signet Plan members received exactly that upon participation in
the First Union Plan. Courts should reject the First Union plaintiffs' proposed
interpretation of ERISA's fiduciary rules and hold that no fiduciary duty exists
on the part of the plan sponsor when it merges participant-directed 401(k) ac-
counts, even when it cancels investment alternatives in the merged plan without
examination of those alternatives. Such a bright-line standard will prevent an
interpretation of ERISA that creates an oppressive and complex body of rules in
the context of corporate merger; confusion and inconsistency for employers,
employees, and other plan officials with respect to their rights and duties in a
merger; and voluminous litigation for all.
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